In spite of the vastness of the literature on Bloomsbury, relatively little attention has been paid to its relationship to Freud.\(^1\) This results, I suspect, from the fact that the four members and associates of Bloomsbury most closely connected to psychoanalysis, James and Alix Strachey and Karin and Adrian Stephen, were peripheral to the group and from the widely held view, supported by Bloomsbury itself,\(^2\) that, in any event, there was no common set of Bloomsbury ideas and interests so that the interest of one part of the group in psychoanalysis remained, as Raymond Williams puts it, "disconnected" from Lytton Strachey's interest in history or Maynard Keynes's interest in economics or Leonard Woolf's interest in politics.\(^3\)


Now while it is true that Bloomsbury cannot be associated with any particular set of doctrines, and indeed that members held very different ideas about art, philosophy, psychoanalysis, etc., nevertheless, as even those who insist on this point make clear, there was what might be called a Bloomsbury spirit. Moreover, the disconnections between the interests of the various members and associates of Bloomsbury were not as pronounced as has sometimes been claimed. Certainly interest in Freud extended beyond those who became practicing analysts. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that Maynard Keynes, Leonard Woolf, and Lytton Strachey became sufficiently interested to make significant use of psychoanalysis in their own work. Such influence is well-established for Strachey. In an earlier paper I pointed to evidence suggesting that it is also present in Keynes's economics. This paper will point to evidence of it in the political writings of Keynes and Woolf.

As I will attempt to show, it is in the appropriations of Freud made by these nonanalyst members that significant influence of what for lack of a better term I have called the Bloomsbury spirit can be found. This cannot be said, however, of the appropriations made by the Bloomsbury analysts. Such influence is not evident, for example, in the Stracheys' translations of Freud. The result is that the Bloomsbury spirit seems to have had little if any direct impact on the

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4 Woolf (Beginning Again, pp. 129–130) quotes a passage from Henry Sidgwick's A Memoir in which the word "spirit" is associated with attitudes characteristic of the Apostles, attitudes that Woolf claims were also characteristic of the individuals who formed the nucleus of Bloomsbury.


7 In their translations, the Stracheys consciously attempted, and many (see, e.g., Meisel and Kendrick, Bloomsbury/Freud, pp. 318–321) would argue managed very successfully, to avoid interpretation. The main criticism made of the translations along these lines, that they fail to bring out the humanistic character of Freud's thought, points, in any event, to an interpretive element which, even if present, could not, I think, be traced to Bloomsbury. If anything, the Bloomsbury influence ought to have led the Stracheys to unduly emphasize the humanistic side of Freud.
development of psychoanalysis in Britain since the appropriations of Freud which can be said to have been significantly influenced by this spirit had no effect on this development. 8

Though both Keynes and Woolf made what could be called Bloomsbury appropriations of Freud, they reached very different political conclusions. In each case Freud enters as the provider of a framework for understanding what Keynes called "the vulgar passions." Woolf, however, makes use of Freud to argue that authoritarian economic, social, and political arrangements are the source of the expressions of these passions, which are the main impediment to civilization. Keynes, in contrast, sees such arrangements as a necessary part of the defense of civilization from the vulgar passions.

The first part of the paper provides an account of the Bloomsbury spirit. The second and third parts examine the influence of both this spirit and psychoanalysis on the political ideas of Woolf and Keynes.

The Bloomsbury Spirit

The Bloomsbury spirit was comprised of three main elements: anti-Victorianism, G. E. Moore's ethics, and belief in the importance and danger of irrationality. These elements

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8 The association with Bloomsbury did, of course, significantly affect the development of British psychoanalysis in other ways. It connected psychoanalysis to a "powerful intellectual elite" (Gregorio Kohon, ed., The British School of Psychoanalysis: The Independent Tradition [London: Free Association Books, 1986], p. 46). It also influenced the kind of psychoanalysis which developed, but this was more because of the particular characteristics of the associates and relations of Bloomsbury directly involved in the psychoanalytic movement than of anything that might be called a Bloomsbury interpretation of Freud. Such features of British psychoanalysis as the more important and independent role given to lay analysts, the greater ability of psychoanalysis in Britain to "remain a cultural as well as a therapeutic or professional pursuit" (Edward Glover, "The Position of Psycho-Analysis in Great Britain," British Medical Bulletin 6, nos. 1–2 [1949]: 31), the influence of Melanie Klein, etc., result in part at least from the characteristics and interests of the Bloomsbury analysts, particularly those of James and Alix Strachey (see Meisel and Kendrick, Bloomsbury Freud, "Introduction" and "Epilogue").
predisposed Bloomsbury to a sympathetic reception of Freud. As we shall see, they also influenced the appropriations of Freud made by Woolf and Keynes.

Anti-Victorianism. From its beginnings as a group of friends at Cambridge, Bloomsbury was profoundly anti-Victorian. Describing the early beliefs of this Cambridge group, Leonard Woolf writes:

When in the grim, grey, rainy January days of 1901 Queen Victoria lay dying, we already felt that we were living in an era of incipient revolt and that we ourselves were mortally involved in this revolt against a social system and code of conduct and morality which, for convenience sake, may be referred to as bourgeois Victorianism. We did not initiate this revolt. When we went up to Cambridge, its protagonists were Swinburne, Bernard Shaw, Samuel Butler in The Way of All Flesh, and to some extent Hardy and Wells. We were passionately on the side of these champions of freedom of speech and freedom of thought, of common sense and reason. We felt that, with them as our leaders, we were struggling against a religious and moral code of cant and hypocrisy which produced and condoned such social crimes and judicial murders as the condemnation of Dreyfus.

Partly, of course, this involved a rejection of Victorian morality, particularly, but by no means only, Victorian sexual morality. More fundamentally, however, the revolt was an expression of rationalism and antiauthoritarianism. Love of

9 The members of Bloomsbury did not all become supporters of psychoanalysis, however. Clive Bell appears to have been hostile (see, e.g., "Dr. Freud on Art," Nation and Athenaeum, Sept. 6, 1924), and Virginia Woolf, though she seems to have changed her attitude near the end of her life, wrote of psychoanalysis in a 1924 letter to Molly McCarthy: "We are publishing all Dr. Freud, and I glance at the proof and read how Mr. A. B. threw a bottle of red ink on to the sheets of his marriage bed to excise his impotence to the housemaid, but threw it in the wrong place, which unhinged his wife's mind. — and to this day she pours claret on the dinner table. We could all go on like that for hours; and yet these Germans think it proves something—besides their own gull-like imbecility" (Nigel Nicholson, ed., The Letters of Virginia Woolf, vol. 3 [London: Hogarth Press, 1977], p. 134–135).

truth, a taste for discussion in pursuit of truth, complete frankness in such discussion combined with mutual respect for each other's point of view—these, according to Quentin Bell, Leonard Woolf, and others, were the attitudes most characteristic of Bloomsbury.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Moore's Ethics}. Though they were opposed to both the authoritarianism and the content of Victorian morality, particularly that governing relations between men and women, Bloomsbury was not without an ethic. They claimed, however, to be able to ground ethical beliefs in reason. Their guide and teacher in this area was G. E. Moore. It was Moore who provided many of the specific ideas which can be said to have been characteristic of Bloomsbury.\textsuperscript{12} According to Woolf, the main things they derived from Moore's influence were "his peculiar passion for truth, for clarity and common sense, and a passionate belief in certain values."\textsuperscript{13}

For Moore, as Rod O'Donnell points out, "ethics is a science, and a subject in which reason is capable of providing true, objective and synthetic answers."\textsuperscript{14} The basic questions it attempts to answer are: What is good? What things are

\textsuperscript{11} Keynes, in his criticism of aspects of these discussions in "My Early Beliefs," suggests, however, that other elements were also involved. The discussions were, he claims, in accordance with "Moore's method," with Moore's claim that knowledge of what states of mind are good is the product of "direct unanalysable intuition" aided by the "instrument of impecable grammar and an unambiguous dictionary" (John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Biography, in The Collected Writings, ed. Donald Moggridge, 50 vols. [London: Macmillan, 1971–90], 10:437, 440). By 1938 Keynes had become quite critical of this method. He says of it, for example, that it produced a kind of intellectual combat in which "strength of character was really much more valuable than subtlety of mind" (ibid., p. 440). Consequently, "victory was with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility" (ibid., p. 438). Keynes, it should also be said, came, as we shall see, to believe there was something positive and worthy of "reverence" in Victorian arrangements. Woolf did not (see Woolf, Sowing, pp. 155–154).

\textsuperscript{12} Woolf, Sowing, p. 144–157; Woolf, Beginning Again, pp. 24–25.

\textsuperscript{13} Woolf, Beginning Again, p. 24.

intrinsically good? What ought we to do? Good, Moore claims, is a simple object indefinable in terms of other objects. Thus, for example, good is not pleasure, though pleasure may be an element in things which are good. Our knowledge of the good comes through direct acquaintance, through direct unanalyzable intuition. Moore claims that "by far the most valuable things we can know or imagine are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects."15 Virtually all goods are complex organic unities, unities in which the goodness of the whole is not equal to the sum of the goodnesses of the parts. Practically, what we are obliged to do, what we ought to do, is to act so as to bring it about that "as much of them [goods] as possible may at some time exist."16 We are morally bound to perform those actions which "will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe." On the basis of premises about probability and about the knowledge required to act in accordance with this dictum, Moore claims that

with regard to any rule which is generally useful, we may assert that it ought always to be observed, not on the ground that in every particular case it will be useful, but on the ground that in every particular case the probability of its being so is greater than that of our being likely to decide rightly that we have before us an instance of its disutility. In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it. It is this fact which seems to justify the stringency with which moral rules are usually enforced and sanctioned.17

Moore's doctrines were not swallowed whole. In responding to them, the members of Bloomsbury remained true to their belief in critical rationalism. Woolf, for example, appears not

15 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 188.
16 Ibid., p. 189.
17 Ibid., pp. 162–163.
to have accepted direct unanalyzable intuition as an adequate method for grounding propositions in ethics or other parts of philosophy. He condemns its use by others, e.g. Bergson, as "intellectual quackery." He frequently expresses a preference for skepticism over any form of foundationalism:

By metaphysical quackery I mean the abandonment of and contempt for reason as a means to truth in non-political speculation and the substitution for it of so-called intuition, magic and mysticism. A determined and honest application of reason to the universe as we know it seems inevitably to lead to skepticism and agnosticism, to a disbelief in what appears to be absolute truths, to a conviction that the truth which seems to us most certainly true and most rigorously proved, the belief which we are totally unable not to believe, even reason itself, all these are dubious and precarious and may well be merely delusions and superstitions, the shadow dreams of shadows.

Keynes, who, under the influence of Principia Ethica and Russell's Principles of Mathematics, spent most of his early intellectual life working on the philosophy of probability, early on came to the conclusion that the premises about probability on which Moore's advocacy of obedience to general moral rules was based were mistaken and so rejected the conclusion. As we shall see, as he grew older he parted company with Moore in other significant ways.

Irrationality. Another aspect of the Bloomsbury spirit, an aspect particularly important to an examination of Bloomsbury's appropriation of Freud, was its attitude to irrationality. In opposition to an argument Keynes makes in his autobiographical memoir, "My Early Beliefs," Quentin Bell argues that from the beginning Bloomsbury was acutely aware of the terrible results of irrationality:

19 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
The sleep of reason engenders monsters, the monsters of violence. It was therefore absolutely necessary, if charity were to survive in the world, that reason should be continually awake.

This I think was the assumption that determined Bloomsbury's attitude and gave a distinctive tone to its art and to its conversations.

No one today could for one moment suppose that the irrational forces in life, the love of death and of violence, were not present in the world, or that they do not lie somewhere within each of us, but whereas to some of us they are not merely immanent but something to be embraced and accepted with joy, connected as they are with so many great spiritual experiences, for Bloomsbury they were something to be chained, muzzled and as far as possible suppressed. The great interest of Bloomsbury lies in the consistency, the thoroughness and, despite almost impossible difficulties, the success with which this was done.21

Anti-Victorian, rationalist, aware of the threat posed to civilized values by irrationality, some members of Bloomsbury, not surprisingly, became sufficiently interested in psychoanalysis to make use of it in their own work.

Woolf on Politics

The main emphasis in Woolf's political writing is on the role of what he calls "communal psychology" in the determination of political events. The three volumes of his major work are subtitled "A Study in Communal Psychology."22 By communal psychology he means:

the ideas, beliefs, and emotions, within the minds of individuals, regarding the community of which they form a part and regarding the relations of individuals to it and to one another;

21 Quentin Bell, Bloomsbury, p. 105.
when analyzed, it is found to consist of an intricate mass of traditions, customs, beliefs, passions, and ideals.23

Woolf assigns communal psychology a very important role in history and civilization. Civilization "consists partly of the actual structure of society . . . and partly of this communal psychology." History is "largely determined by communal psychology." It is the outcome of this psychology interacting with the structure of society, changes in the structure being partly the cause of changes in communal psychology and changes in communal psychology producing changes in the structure of society.

In making this claim, Woolf explicitly rejects the notion which he associates with many Marxists (though not with Marx) that ideas and ideals "have little effect upon the social history of human beings."24 As we shall see, the role Woolf assigns to psychology and ideals is very like the role Keynes assigns.

The Influence of Moore and Marx. Woolf's treatment of the ideal owes much to Moore and to Marx. In Principia Politica (a book whose title is due to Keynes25) he provides a brief account of the ethical theory on which his approach to history and politics is based.26 The account follows Moore very closely. He argues that values are objective, that the things which have intrinsic value, including the things which have what he calls "social value," are nearly always complex organic unities, and that, in the case of individual values, they are "complex psychological states." The main novel element is the notion of a "social value." Such value attaches "to any 'body of human beings in some kind of relationship,' if in those relations the individuals

23 Woolf, Principia, p. 15.
25 Woolf, Principia, p. vi.
26 Ibid., pp. 90-94.
have this particular attitude of mind and way of living [think for themselves and have the courage of their convictions] and the body of men, by its manners, customs, organization, or laws, actively or passively, encourages the attitude of mind and way of living."27 Values of this kind, when accepted or attained by a society, Woolf calls "social standards of value" or "standards of social value."28 The "civilized" societies in which such standards obtain are, of course, complex organic unities:

The structure of a civilized society and the psychology of a civilized man are not simple entities which can be described or defined in a single sentence; they are complexes and in those complexes the quality 'civilized' depends upon the existence of a number of different elements.29

The object of "practical politics," which, as Woolf understands it, is a branch of practical ethics, is to maximize the amount of social value in the world.

Woolf points to a number of social values. The principal ones, those which define the civilized society, are happiness, equality, and freedom. These are the essential elements in what he calls the democratic ideal.30 By happiness he means that a civilized community is one which enables everyone to realize happiness and which regards each individual's happiness to be as important as any other's. He credits Bentham and the utilitarians with introducing this idea into modern thought but departs radically from their conception of the sources of happiness and from what Keynes called Benthamism, the identification of happiness with money and the associated auri sacra fames. For a life to be happy, it must be good in Moore's sense.

By equality, he means, as might be expected, equal rights

27 Ibid., p. 97.
28 Ibid.
29 Woolf, After the Deluge, 2:42.
and equality before the law. He also means much more than this, however. He means equality in all the means, including the economic means, to a good life, equality of economic status, and so on. For this reason, the good society involves communal control of economic as well as political power.

The third element in complexes having high social value is freedom. Woolf claims it is an essential element in those complexes which have the highest value. By itself, however, freedom does not possess intrinsic value. Indeed, its presence can add to the evil of particular organic unities, for example, in the lives of individuals who wish to torture others.31

In addition to the obvious connection to Moore, Woolf's treatment of ethics and the ideal society is, as he himself explicitly points out, importantly influenced by Marx. In Barbarians at the Gate, he describes himself as a "Marxian socialist—but only 'up to a point'."32 The reservations are those he believes a critical rationalist must make with any other writer's work, those he also makes, for example, in his generally very positive evaluations of Freud. Only the "doctrinal lunatic" treats another person's ideas as wholly true. Woolf frequently makes use of passages from Marx in his account of the ideal society. In particular, he frequently uses

31 This points to an aspect of Woolf's account that is incompatible with Marx. Consistent with Moore, Woolf treats relations, including the relation between elements making up organic unities, as external rather than internal relations. Freedom, for example, is treated as externally related to the other elements making up an organic complex. Marx regards such relations as internal. He would not, for example, regard the torturer as a free person. She/he is a slave to irrational passions. Freedom is internally related to the other elements of a good life. Moore (Principia, pp. 33–34) explicitly rejects this conception of organic unity as internal relations, a conception he associates with Hegel.

This is only one of the Hegelian aspects of Marx that Woolf too readily rejects as nonsense (Barbarians, pp. 123–124). In fact, it is these aspects, which include the notion of objective freedom as well as the notion of internal relations, which underpin those features of Marx to which Woolf points in defending his own interpretation against the interpretations of many Marxists. In any event, as we shall see, barbarism, as Woolf understands it, cannot be characteristic of a truly free person. He adopts a Freudian explanation of barbarism which makes the barbarian the slave of his passions.

32 Woolf, Barbarians, p. 124.
the following passages from the *Communist Manifesto.* The ideal society is "an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." It is also one where "accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer." According to both Marx and Woolf, the good society is one in which "the ultimate end is the widening and enrichment of the individual's existence, the creation of an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." At the end of *Barbarians at the Gate,* Woolf provides the following summary of his view of the good society:

Western civilization, the full development of a society of free men, a community in which the freedom of each is the condition for the freedom of all—it is necessary to say it again for the last time—requires three things:

(1) Communal control of the controllers of communal power, which we may legitimately call for short democracy;
(2) Communal control of economic power, which is Socialism or Communism;
(3) An active, passionate communal acceptance and pursuit of certain social ideas, principles, and standards of value without which freedom and equality cannot be maintained and without which to talk of widening and enriching the existence of individual men and women is either cynical dishonesty or mere stupidity: they are justice, truth, tolerance, and humanity.

This then is Woolf's vision of the civilized ideal. It stands in sharp contrast to what he calls the barbarian ideal. The two ideals differ most about freedom and authority. Freedom is an essential element in the complex organic unity which constitutes, for Woolf, the civilized ideal. For the barbarian, in contrast, the highest social value is obedience and the ideal society is the society of masters and slaves. Woolf claims these

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53 E.g., *ibid.*, p. 66.
barbarian ideals are not merely mistaken; they have their roots in irrationality.

_**Irrationality and the Influence of Freud.**_ Contradicting what Keynes says of early Bloomsbury in "My Early Beliefs," Woolf claims always to have believed in the importance of human irrationality.36 What he disbelieves is the concept of original sin. Humans have the potential for rationality, a potential which is only realized where the environment permits. Woolf disagrees with Keynes not about the existence of irrationality but about its origins. As we shall see, Keynes, following Freud, claims these are innate and hence irremovable. Woolf, in contrast, claims they are located in the social environment. In particular, he claims they are the outcome of authoritarian social relations, relations which Keynes, by 1938, had come to see, given his view of the origins of barbarism, as a necessary part of the defense of civilization from barbarism.37 It is here, in his analysis of irrationality, that Woolf makes use of psychoanalysis.

The central idea in European history to which Woolf traces opposition to civilized values is "the sense of sin." This

began as a religious and metaphysical doctrine, but its spell was

37 Quentin Bell (Bloomsbury, p. 95) points to an even more striking difference between Woolf and Clive Bell. "Clive Bell sees civilization as something that exists only in an elite and from which the helots who serve that elite are permanently excluded. The manner in which civilization is to be preserved is immaterial; if it can be maintained by a democracy so much the better, but there is no fundamental objection to a tyranny so long as it maintains a cultured class with unearned incomes. To Leonard Woolf it appears that all attempts to make a civilization which relies upon military or ecclesiastical power are doomed, for these forces are bound to turn against reason when reason threatens their supremacy; the only hope for civilisation is that it shall find support in the masses.

"The difference of approach is of enormous importance; it is the difference between one who would and one who would not submit to fascism. Nevertheless there is some common ground, for while both would in the end accept the use of force, the one in resisting, the other in establishing a tyrant, to both the idea of violence was extremely painful, and painful in part because it implied the abdication of reason."
so potent, its implications so widely subtle, that it gradually penetrated the whole field of European life and thought, forming a vast ganglion of interrelated ideas and beliefs which affected or infected not only men's religions, but the whole of their social and political life. It was, of course, an important part of that spiritual matrix in which the minds of Europeans received a common form. It was not often a system of ideas consciously used by the individual or community as a rational motive for action. But it lay in the background of all men's minds, entangled in all their thoughts, impregnating all their beliefs; it coloured their whole outlook on the world; in religion and in the social and political ordering of their lives it kept their eyes and minds always turned in a certain direction so that they could scarcely see anything sane or humane which fell outside this foggy circle of sin and punishment and hell. Finally, it always lay in the background and in the depths of their minds, a vast reservoir from which every man might at any moment fish up some fairy tale with which to rationalize his passions or excuse his desires.38

This sense of sin, he claims, "accounts for the rigidity and persistence of the authoritarian view of politics."

Woolf makes use of psychoanalysis to explain the sense of sin:

Thanks to Freud, we know today a great deal more than our ancestors about the origin and effects of this sense of sin. Like all great men who break new ground in human thought, Freud was not infallible, and his doctrines, unlike those of religious religions (e.g. Christianity) or political religions (e.g. communism), are not absolute truth, but scientific hypotheses perpetually subject to revision in the light of new facts or new tests. One may doubt the truth of a good many of Freud's speculative hypotheses and of his brilliantly complicated interpretations, but there can be little or no doubt that his contribution to psychology, in his analysis of the working of the conscious and unconscious mind, is as new and important as were the contributions of Newton and Darwin to other sciences. And just as Newton's and Darwin's discoveries or hypotheses profoundly affected spheres of thought and knowledge far outside the sciences in which they were made, so Freud's discoveries regarding the unconscious are of immense significance, not

38 Woolf, After the Deluge, 1:223.
merely for individual psychology, but also for religion, ethics, politics, and sociology. Of all his contributions, that which is probably the most fundamental and far-reaching concerns man’s sense of sin.

I believe that this sense of sin and the way in which human beings deal with it, and therefore with the question of punishment and standards of value, are one of the keys to civilization. To be a slave to it is barbarism; to control it is civilization. To understand it is essential to an understanding of the breakdown of civilization.39

He points particularly to Freud’s account of the Oedipus complex.40

Woolf also points41 to a specific psychoanalytic account of the origin and role of the sense of sin, the account found in R. E. Money-Kyrle’s *Psychoanalysis and Politics*.42 He says of this account: “Mr. Money-Kyrle’s facts and arguments seem to me to provide new evidence for the view taken by me of communal psychology in its relation to social values.”

Money-Kyrle distinguishes two types of moral character: the democratic and the authoritarian. He associates these with different structures of conscience. These structures are traced in turn to different family backgrounds. He also points to the influence of work relations. He provides, in other words, an account of the authoritarian personality in terms of the “sense of sin,” an account which, like Woolf’s, connects this to a particular social context.

Money-Kyrle’s initial interest in the light psychoanalysis might shed on politics grew out of his involvement in a study of the psychological roots of fascism and Nazism in Germany. He claims two types of individual were readily identifiable in

40 Ibid., pp. 66–67.
41 Ibid., p. 269.
postwar Germany: the democratic character with a humanistic conscience and the antidemocratic with an authoritarian conscience.43

His account of the development of these two types is importantly influenced by the work of Melanie Klein.44 It can be briefly summarized as follows: In early infancy the mechanisms of splitting and projection create a fantasy world split into good and bad objects. Ego development is influenced by the introjection of these objects. The first stage of this development is what Klein calls the "persecutory" or "paranoid" position. Splitting along with the projection of the infant's own anger and rejection creates a world of enemies threatening attack and possession (through introjection). In the next stage the splitting is undone. Good and bad qualities begin to be seen as aspects of the same object. Love and hate therefore come to be directed at the same object. The child believes its aggressive wishes can magically bring harm to the object. Given the ambivalence, these wishes are now seen to threaten an object which is loved as well as hated. This produces the feelings of depression which characterize what Klein calls the "depressive" position in the development of the ego.

This Kleinian view of development provides, according to Money-Kyrle, a basis for an account of the development of different types of "moral character"—specifically, of the democratic and authoritarian characters. These reflect different structures of conscience, differences which are expressed by the different senses of guilt, of sin, produced by each structure. We are thus led back to Woolf's "sense of sin" as the key element distinguishing the democratic from the authoritarian character. "Moral behaviour may be defined as behaviour dictated by the fear of a sense of guilt."45 The sense of guilt is a compound of two feelings—persecutory and

43 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
44 Klein's influence in England owed much, of course, to her relation to Bloomsbury, particularly to James and Alix Strachey.
45 Money-Kyrle, Psychoanalysis and Politics, p. 54.
depressive. Persecutory guilt is based on “fear of punishment,” depressive on “fear of injuring, deserting or disappointing something that is loved.” The response to guilt depends on which feeling dominates. Persecutory guilt arouses propitiatory, depressive reparatory, behaviour.

Later in development the internal persecutors and benefactors created by introjection in early infancy become the superego, the structure of conscience. This will be “paranoid” or “depressive” depending on which internal object dominates. Domination by the good object produces the humanistic character; by the persecutory, bad object, the authoritarian. In the former case guilt will be principally depressive; in the latter case it will be persecutory.

According to Money-Kyrle, the two kinds of moral character involve different degrees of rationality. Rationality is measured by the degree to which beliefs are the outcome of logic and perception. On this measure, the humanistic is the more rational character because the depressive guilt associated with it arises from acceptance of the reality of the unity of the object. Moreover, deep analysis, which brings more and more of the unconscious to consciousness where it can be subjected to the tests of logic and perception, i.e., which increases rationality, invariably, according to Money-Kyrle, produces changes in moral character “away from the authoritarian and towards the humanistic end of the scale.”

In fact, full rationality would be associated with the complete absorption of the superego into the ego for the reason that nonassimilation results from the superego’s embodiment of previously projected sadism and aggression and from unconscious and hence irrational fear of contaminating the good part of the superego by bringing it into contact with the ego. With full rationality, superego morality, the internal source of guilt, which, according to Money-Kyrle, “is predominantly of an authoritarian kind,” would disappear. There would,

46 Ibid., p. 18.
however, still be an external source of guilt. Insight into one's own personality would produce empathy toward others. This empathy would make us feel guilty should we injure or neglect them. Reason and love hence produce, in the limit, the fully democratic character.

Money-Kyrle also traces the two types of character to particular social and family contexts. He downplays the influence of heredity. He also claims that it was very easy to correlate these two types of conscience both with different types of home and with different types of occupation . . . almost all the humanists came from homes in which there had been an unusual degree of both freedom and affection; and they were more frequently to be found among those who had followed art or science as a career than among those concerned with administration. Conversely, the authoritarians, with an almost monotonous regularity, spoke of the strict patriarchal nature of their early environment to which they gratefully attributed their own regard for discipline. . . . [In addition] the influence of occupational environment was . . . by no means negligible—especially when it operated in an antihumanist and pro-authoritarian direction.

In consequence, "the authoritarian morality, which parades obedience to some external power or inner code as the highest form of virtue, is a typical product of the oedipus complex as this develops in an authoritarian society and a patriarchal home." Woolf offers a very similar account of the role played by the social environment, particularly by authoritarian and patriarchal relations, in the development of character. To begin with, he shares, albeit a bit tentatively, Money-Kyrle's view of the respective weights to be given to heredity and environment. Second, he provides an elaborate proposal for greatly reducing

47 Ibid., p. 82.
49 Ibid., pp. 72–75.
50 See, for example, Woolf, After the Deluge, 1:253.
51 Ibid., pp. 264–266.
the authoritarian element in child rearing, the element he finds mainly responsible for barbarism.\footnote{Woolf, \textit{Principia}, pp. 109–141.} Because he accepts Freud's account of the primal instincts,\footnote{"Man is born with instincts and his desires and inclinations are determined by his instincts. In order to be civilized, indeed in order to live at all as a member of any community, the individual has to learn, somehow or other, to thwart, control, and direct his instincts, his desires, his inclinations. In order to be free he must learn how to lose his freedom" (Woolf, \textit{Principia}, p. 112). Woolf repeats this claim fairly frequently in his political writing.} he does "not believe that any adjustment of the individual to the necessities of modern communal life is possible without external compulsion of the child. But there remains a fundamental difference between the authoritarian and the libertarian solution of the problem of civilizing infants and children."\footnote{Woolf, \textit{Principia}, p. 112.} The libertarian approach "consists in substituting for the sanctions of fear and sin those of love (in the widest sense) and—I hesitate to introduce such an unfashionable idea—reason."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.} Woolf relies for most of his evidence on his experiences domesticating animals (the Woolfs, of course, were childless). The discussion is, I think, not completely successful. The problem is partly the result of his uncritical acceptance of Freud's premises about instincts, premises which are incompatible with the wider philosophical framework of Woolf's approach.

For Woolf, in any event, authoritarian arrangements are the source of the danger to civilized values; not, as we shall see in Keynes, a necessary defense against it. Woolf is a social optimist; Keynes a social pessimist:

The democratic ideal, as I have described it, is a society of free, equal, active, and intelligent citizens, each man choosing his own way of life for himself and willing that others should choose theirs. The democrat is, you see, an optimist about human nature and human society; he wants us all to become like gods,
free, independent people, forming our own views about the world and politics, and all cooperating in the State and in politics to build up a society in which men can live and think like gods.56

Keynes on Politics

Like Woolf, Keynes gives an important role to ideas and ideals in the determination of economic and political events. In a letter to Roy Harrod on the subject of Jan Tinbergen's early work in econometrics, Keynes, in differentiating the methods appropriate in the moral sciences from those appropriate in the natural sciences, emphasizes the role of values, motives, and psychological factors. "Economics is essentially a moral science and not a natural science. That is to say, it employs introspection and judgments of value."57 This point is reiterated in another letter to Harrod on the same subject:

I also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple's motives, on whether it is worth falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth.58

Keynes's understanding of values owed much to Moore. This understanding significantly influenced his political views.59

The Influence of Moore. Though he was never in complete agreement with Moore, Keynes, as "My Early Beliefs" makes clear,

56 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
58 Ibid., p. 300.
59 For recent discussions of the influence of Moore on Keynes's politics, see A. Fitzgibbons, Keynes' Vision: A New Political economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), and O'Donnell, Keynes.
continued throughout his life to believe in important aspects of Moore's ethics. In particular, he continued to believe that goodness was an objective property of certain states of mind. Good states of mind were complex organic unities. They were achieved by contemplating appropriate objects. Keynes continued to believe, with Moore, that love and beauty were such objects.

The agreement with Moore was never complete, however. As early as his undergraduate years at Cambridge, Keynes insisted, for example, that "good" could only be a property of states of mind; it could not be a property of the objects of such states. The appropriate judgment in the case of objects was of "fitness" rather than "goodness." During this period, he also, as I pointed out above, rejected Moore's implicit premises about probability and the conclusions Moore based on them. These disagreements with Moore increased as Keynes grew older. Keynes appears, for example, to have abandoned Moore's atomism in favor of organicism and to have abandoned important aspects of Moore's method of doing philosophy.60

The most important difference between his early and mature beliefs to which he points in "My Early Beliefs" is that between his early and mature psychological beliefs. He claims to have abandoned the belief that "human nature is reasonable." This led to significant changes in both his ethical and his political beliefs. Keynes's view of the nature and implications of human irrationality appears to have been significantly influenced by Freud. As in the case of the influence of Freud on Keynes's economics, however, the evidence is almost entirely indirect.61 It consists mainly of the

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61 The direct evidence is not insignificant, however. It is outlined in Winslow, "Keynes and Freud," pp. 554–556. There is evidence suggesting that the relatively infrequent explicit references to Freud and psychoanalysis in Keynes's writing result
consistency of Keynes's arguments with Freud's. In fact, Keynes's arguments, though they seldom make direct reference to Freud, are more consistent with Freud's than are Woolf's.62

Irrationality and the Influence of Freud. In "My Early Beliefs," Keynes claims that Bloomsbury's early ethical beliefs had been "flimsily based . . . on an a priori view of what human nature is like, both other people's and our own, which was disastrously mistaken . . . the view that human nature is reasonable."63 He claims that "in fact, human affairs are carried on after a most irrational fashion."64 The belief that human nature is reasonable ignored the "deeper and blinder passions," the "vulgar passions."65 It overlooked the "insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men."66

Keynes's abandonment of the belief that human nature is reasonable changed his ethical beliefs in the following ways. Paradoxically, it led him to accept an aspect of Moore's practical ethics which he had earlier rejected (and which he continued in his maturity to reject so far as his own morality was concerned). He now accepted that conventions, traditional standards, and inflexible rules of conduct should govern the ethical lives of the majority. His reasons for accepting this differed from Moore's, however.

He argued that habits of uncritical obedience must be inculcated in most people because most do not possess even the

62 For an example of Freud adopting a view of the origin and implications for civilization of the vulgar passions almost identical to the view attributed to Keynes below and at the same time reacting skeptically to Woolf's kind of social optimism, see Sigmund Freud, "Future of an Illusion," in Sigmund Freud, Civilization, Society and Religion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 184–189.
63 Keynes, Essays in Biography, p. 447.
64 Ibid., p. 449.
65 Ibid., pp. 449, 450.
66 Ibid., p. 447.
rudiments of what is required for rational judgment. They lack "the wisdom, experience and self-control" necessary to successfully "judge every individual case on its merits." In consequence, "immoralism" is not an appropriate ethical stance for everyone. For those lacking the capacity for rational judgment, morality cannot be left a matter for individual judgment. Most people cannot be "safely released from the outward restraints of convention and traditional standards and inflexible rules of conduct, and left, from now onwards, to their own sensible devices, pure motives and reliable intuitions of the good." "Customary morals, conventions and traditional wisdom" must be respected and upheld because they protect civilization from the "insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men."

Civilization is "a thin and precarious crust erected by the personality and the will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and conventions skillfully put across and guilefully preserved." "Traditional wisdom" and the "restraints of custom" deserve respect as do "the extraordinary accomplishment of our predecessors in the ordering of life" and

the elaborate framework which they had devised to protect this

67 Keynes once said of Marxism: "How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement?" (Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, in Collected Writings, 9: 258). Most of Keynes's remarks about Marx are, in contrast to Woolf's, highly critical and dismissive. They are also often very foolish. For example, in "My Early Beliefs" he calls Marxism "the final reductio ad absurdum of Benthamism." This dismissive attitude prevents him from seeing that Marx's economics is constructed on philosophical and psychological foundations remarkably like his own (see, however, Keynes, General Theory and After, p. 81).

There is a passage in "My Early Beliefs" (Essays in Biography, p. 442) in which Keynes unfavorably contrasts the vision of the ideal found in what he calls "Freud cum Marx" with the vision found in Moore. This is not a rejection of Freudian ideas, however. Freud and Marx would themselves have rejected the vision of the ideal found in "Freud cum Marx."

68 Keynes, Essays in Biography, p. 446.
69 Ibid., p. 447.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
order. Plato said in his *Laws* that one of the best of a set of good laws would be a law forbidding any young man to enquire which of them are right or wrong, though an old man remarking any defect in the laws might communicate this observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man was present.72

Once we understand the role convention, traditional standards, and inflexible rules of conduct play, we should, as early Bloomsbury did not, include "the order and pattern of life amongst communities and the emotions which they can inspire" among "the objects of valuable contemplation and communion."73 To threaten them by ridicule, as Keynes and his friends had done in their youth, was to threaten civilization itself. The two essays, "Dr. Melchior: A Defeated Enemy" and "My Early Beliefs" (essays which deserve close attention, among other reasons because they were published "in order to carry out an express desire in [Keynes's] will that these papers, and these alone of his unpublished writings, should be printed")74 have this as one of their main points. Keynes is admitting to and apologizing for the disrespect and irreverence of his youth.

The change in Keynes's psychological views also led him to add "spontaneous, irrational outbursts of human nature"—"spontaneous, volcanic and even wicked impulses"—to his list of possible characteristics of intrinsically good states of mind.75 In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud explains the sort of value such outbursts have. "The feeling of happiness derived from the satisfaction of a wild instinctual impulse untamed by the ego is incomparably more intense than that derived from sating an instinct that has been trained."76 Although the development of rationality and aesthetic sense through

74 David Garnett, in *ibid.*, p. 388.
75 In the passage cited above (n. 21), Quentin Bell disconnects this view from Bloomsbury.
The mature Keynes repudiated his earlier "thin rationalism skipping on the crust of the lava, ignoring both the reality and the value of the vulgar passions, joined to libertinism and comprehensive irreverence." He also adopted a view of the nature and operation of these passions very similar to Freud's.

Keynes's mature belief that most people are innately stupid and barbaric may have been partly anchored in something other than reason, something that found another expression in his "arrogance." Certainly the mature belief did not represent as big a change for Keynes as "My Early Beliefs" suggests. In 1904, in a paper on Burke, he made the following remarks about Burke's argument opposing universal suffrage:

There is, prima facie, a great plausibility in [Burke's] line of argument. . . . There is no very great a priori probability of arriving at desirable results by submitting to the decision of a vast body of persons, who are individually wholly incompetent to deliver a rational judgment on the affair at issue. But whatever may be our conclusions concerning the eventual benefits, that are likely to be derived from an ultrademocratic form of government, it must be admitted that the disasters foretold by its opponents have not come to pass. Democracy is still on trial, but so far it has not disgraced itself; it is true that its full force has not yet come into operation, and this for two causes, one more or less permanent in its effect, the other of a more transient nature. In the first place, whatever the numerical representation of wealth may be, its power will always be out of all proportion; and secondly the defective organisation of the newly enfranchised classes has prevented any overwhelming alteration in the preexisting balance of power.

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77 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
78 Keynes, Essays in Biography, p. 450.
79 On Keynes's arrogance, see Clive Bell, Old Friends, pp. 47–57, and Woolf, Sowing, pp. 145–146.
80 Keynes, as cited in O'Donnel, Keynes, p. 282.
The judgment found here about the abilities of ordinary people and about the implications of this for "an ultra-democratic form of government" are not that much different from his mature beliefs. These include belief in authoritarian political and economic structures.

For example, a passage in a 1925 address to the Liberal Summer School, a passage excised from the version published in *Essays in Persuasion*, endorses authoritarian political party structures.\(^\text{81}\) Should it come, the class war, Keynes claims, will find him on "the side of the educated bourgeoisie." This, however, is not the real reason he will not become a member of the Labour party. The real reason is that, because "questions about the economic framework of society will [in future] be far and away the most important of political issues" and because "the right solution will involve intellectual and scientific elements which must be above the heads of the vast mass of more or less illiterate voters," the party machine must be "sufficiently autocratic" to prevent this mass from exercising too much influence on policy. Of the three parties, the Conservatives are "in much the best position" on this matter, the Liberals, who traditionally were "sufficiently autocratic," have made "ill-advised movements in the direction of democratising the details of the party programme," and Labour is so democratic that "the intellectual elements in the party will never exercise adequate control."

Keynes was also an advocate of corporatism.\(^\text{82}\) He believed capitalism would naturally evolve a corporatist economic structure through the gradual divorcing of ownership from control and the development of constraints on the exercise of that control in the form of a need to placate public opinion. Big enterprise, he claimed, had a tendency "to socialize itself."

It should be emphasized, however, that these differences

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\(^\text{82}\) Ibid., pp. 288–290; see also Keynes, *Social, Political and Literary Writings*, in *Collected Writings*, 28:32–34.
with Woolf were not primarily differences about the nature of the Ideal (though, as I pointed out above, Keynes's understanding of irrationality led to differences here as well). Keynes's belief in original sin, in the innateness of human barbarism and irrationality, led him to the conclusion that Woolf's civilized ideal, however accurate it might be as a description of the best of all conceivable worlds, was not a possible world; it was impracticable. He did, however, want to get as close as possible to it. He was an advocate, for example, of institutional changes which would facilitate the liberation of all women, including working-class women, from the tyranny of the patriarchal family. He was also extremely scornful of the capitalist ideal with its emphasis on the love of money and power:

The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the War, is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous—and it doesn't deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it and we are beginning to despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed.

He also wrote a moving justification, in Moorean terms, of Julian Bell's decision to volunteer for service on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War, a decision that cost Bell his life.

The “Republic of my imagination,” Keynes once said, “is on the extreme left of Celestial space.” His elitism had the result, however, that systems which suppose a rough equality in

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83 Keynes may have believed that in the very long run Woolf's vision could be made practicable through selective breeding. He remained a supporter of eugenics to the end of his life. In some 1946 remarks to the Eugenics Society introducing the Society's gold medal winner for that year, Alexander Carr-Saunders, he describes eugenics as "the most important, significant and, I would add, genuine branch of sociology which exists" (Keynes, "Opening Remarks: The Galton Lecture, 1946," *Eugenics Review* 38 [1946]: 39–40; cited in O'Donnell, *Keynes*, p. 341).


potential for rationality such as Guild Socialism or Marx's communism (as Woolf interprets it) were judged impracticable. On the other hand, extreme authoritarianism, as in fascism or state socialism, was inconsistent with the amount of liberty actually attainable. Liberty, however, was mostly useful to the exceptional and constantly under threat from the barbarians. This brings us to another aspect of the influence of Keynes's mature psychological beliefs on his politics, his views on reform. As we shall see, many of the reforms he proposed were designed to protect civilization from the barbarism of the majority.

This aspect of Keynes's approach to reform is brought out in his review of H. G. Wells's _The World of William Clissold_. He begins the review by siding with those who are dissatisfied with existing "laws, customs, rules, and institutions" and wish to see them changed. "Most but particularly those in the vanguard, find themselves and their environment ill-adapted to one another, and are for this reason far less happy than their less-sophisticated forebears were or their yet more-sophisticated descendants need be."87 He characterizes the third volume of Wells's work as an inquiry into the question "from whence are we to draw the forces which are 'to change the laws, customs, rules, and institutions of the world'?")88

The problem is that "the creative intellect of mankind" is found among the scientists and great modern businessmen, but this "type of mind and character and temperament" which is alone capable of undertaking the task of restructuring society—"a task of immense practical complexity and intellectual difficulty"—has no interest in it. "The remoulding of the world needs the touch of the creative Brahma. But at present Brahma is serving Science and Business, not Politics or Government."89 Wells—and here Keynes is also in agreement

87 _Ibid._, p. 318.
88 _Ibid._
89 _Ibid._, p. 319.
with him—represents the labor movement "as an immense and dangerous force of destruction, led by sentimentalists and pseudointellectuals, who have 'feelings in the place of ideas'." It follows that "the extreme danger of the world is, in Clissold's words, lest 'before the creative Brahma can get to work, Siva, in other words the passionate destructiveness of labour awakening to its needless limitations and privations, may make Brahma's task impossible'." Labor is assumed to have only a very limited capacity for sublimation. Instincts in an unrepressed form—"passionate destructiveness," "insane and irrational springs of wickedness"—are incompatible with civilization, however. Labor's instincts have to be repressed if civilization is to be maintained. The problem is that labor is "awakening"; repression is beginning to break down and thus threaten civilization. The fact that existing institutionalized forms of repression impose "needless limitations and privations" points, however, to a reformist way out of the dilemma.

What reconstruction must aim at is removal of the "needless limitations and privations." The purpose is not, as in Woolf, to create a context in which most people can develop a high degree of rationality since most are assumed to be innately incapable of such development; it is, rather, to keep the dangerous instincts bottled up in order to prevent them from destroying civilization. In other essays, Keynes sets out specific reforms designed to accomplish this aim. Again, there is a close parallel with arguments to be found in Freud.

In 1925, for example, he suggested it was time to put on the

90 Ibid.
91 Keynes's premise that only a few individuals are able to deflect their vulgar passions into the civilized pursuits of science and art, that only a very few are so to speak Apostolic, matches Freud's claim about sublimation. "The weak point of this method [sublimation] is that it is not applicable generally; it is accessible to only a few people. It presupposes the possession of special dispositions and gifts which are far from being common to any practical degree" (Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 17). Of Clissold and another businessman, Keynes says that they "flutter about the world seeking for something to which they can attach their abundant libido. But they have not found it. They would so like to be Apostles. But they cannot. They remain businessmen" (Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, pp. 319–320).
political agenda some relaxation of the rules governing drugs and mass entertainments such as carnivals:

How far is bored and suffering humanity to be allowed from time to time an escape, an excitement, a stimulus, a possibility of change?—that is the important problem. Is it possible to allow reasonable licence, permitted Saturnalia, sanctified Carnival, in conditions which need ruin neither the health nor the pockets of the roisterers and will shelter from irresistible temptation the unhappy class who, in America, are called addicts. 92

The purpose of liberalization in these areas would be to get the mass of the population to accept needful limitations and privations.

A similar argument is made in Civilization and Its Discontents. For those incapable of the sublimated pleasures of the scientist and artist, drugs and carnivals, according to Freud, provide an occasional necessary escape from the miseries of life. “Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot dispense with palliative measures.” Three types of palliative measures are available: “powerful deflections” exemplified by science; “substitutive satisfactions” exemplified by art; and “intoxicating substances.” 93 A subsequent passage reiterates this claim about the role of drugs and points to the dangers of addiction. 94 Elsewhere Freud points to “permitted Saturnalia, sanctified Carnival” as another device for getting the majority to accept the repression which civilization demands. These work by temporarily undoing the separation between the ego ideal and the ego, a separation that “cannot be borne for long . . . and has to be temporarily undone.” 95

Keynes also claims that Victorian attitudes to and laws about sex impose limitations and privations which are not only

92 Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, p. 303.
93 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 12.
94 Ibid., p. 15.
unnecessary to civilization but in fact threaten it by imposing sacrifices on the majority which they now refuse to accept.\textsuperscript{96} This too he claims ought to be an important item on the modern liberal political agenda. Here he has in mind the interconnected questions of sexual repression and sexism. He claims interest in these matters is by no means limited to "the crust on the human boiling."\textsuperscript{97} "There are no subjects about which the big general public is more interested; few which are the subject of wider discussion. They are of the utmost social importance." They are "matters about which everyone wants to know and which deeply affect everyone’s life." The object of reform would be to reduce sexual repression and sexual discrimination:

Birth control and the use of contraceptives, marriage laws, the treatment of sexual offenses and abnormalities, the economic position of women, the economic position of the family—in all these matters the existing state of the law and of orthodoxy is still medieval—altogether out of touch with civilised opinion and civilised practice and with what individuals, educated and uneducated alike, say to one another in private.\textsuperscript{98}

For "working women" birth control and divorce reform "suggest new liberty, emancipation from the most intolerable of tyrannies."

The working class is not the only class for whom the maintenance of needed repression requires reform. Keynes claims in the \textit{General Theory} that the repression and sublimation of "dangerous human proclivities" are facilitated "by the existence of opportunities for money-making and private wealth":

Dangerous human proclivities can be canalised into compara-

\textsuperscript{96} Freud, of course, makes very similar claims about "civilized' sexual morality" (Sigmund Freud, "Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness," in Freud, \textit{Civilization, Society and Religion}, pp. 27–55).

\textsuperscript{97} Keynes, \textit{Essays in Persuasion}, p. 302.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid}. 
tively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities for money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandisement. It is better that a man should tyrannise over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens; and whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative.99

Keynes argued in *A Tract on Monetary Reform* that the “investment system” which canalized both the anal and the sadistic passions could not survive severe price instability. For the reason just given, this system is part of the conventional and customary arrangements which defend civilization from barbarism. It follows that the monetary reforms necessary to the preservation of reasonable price stability are also necessary to the preservation of civilization. Although the particular canalization of libido which the investment system provided could, on account of the irrationality of the investing class, withstand a certain amount of incompatibility between beliefs about money values and the facts, it could not withstand the sort of revolution in money values that occurred during and after World War I. As the rise of fascism and Nazism (which were most strongly rooted in the lower middle class) was subsequently to show, this had brought about a change in the communal psychology of the middle classes which made them a much more direct threat to civilized values.100

Keynes saw certain conventional arrangements in monetary and other matters as necessary to the preservation of the possibility of civilization. The conventions worked to bottle up passions which if released would destroy civilization. He was a conservative in the sense that, given his low opinion of the


100 Keynes’s analysis of the psychological roots of Nazism is very similar to Woolf’s. See, for example, Woolf, *Barbarians*, pp. 128–137.
motives and the intelligence of the ordinary person, he felt that all sorts of traditional rules and practices, although they would be judged inappropriate if we could assume that all members of the community were completely rational, could be shown to be appropriate when we notice that this assumption is unjustified. He found much orthodox conservatism to be itself a threat to civilization, however, because it maintained an irrational attachment to particular conventional rules and practices quite irrespective of the fact that in contemporary circumstances such conventions had not only ceased to protect civilization by bottling up the dangerous and vulgar passions but had themselves become the main factor threatening to force such passions back out of the bottle. In the preface to the Tract he says that “nowhere do conservative notions consider themselves more in place than in currency; yet nowhere is the need of innovation more urgent.”

Summary and Conclusion

I have attempted to show that the appropriations of Freud found in Woolf’s and Keynes’s political writings were importantly influenced by attitudes and ideas characteristic of Bloomsbury. The anti-Victorianism, expressed more positively as critical rationalism, is evident both in the insistence on reading Freud critically and in the use of Freud as a basis for important aspects of the critique of Victorian values. Keynes, of course, came in his maturity to view Victorian arrangements in a more positive light. Even in this, however, he appears to have been significantly influenced by Freud.

The influence of Moore is evident both in the general features of the philosophical framework which Woolf and Keynes employ in their appropriations of Freud (the belief in the objectivity of values, the importance given to states of

101 Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, in Collected Writings, 4: xiv.
mind, the conception of good things as complex organic unities, the conception of politics as practical ethics) and in their beliefs about the specific components of good states of mind (both continued to place great stress on "the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects"). Consistent with their belief in critical rationalism, both made amendments to Moore. Woolf introduced the notion of "social values," and Keynes, among other changes, added "spontaneous, irrational outbursts of human nature" to the list of important elements in good states of mind and "the order and pattern of life amongst communities and the emotions which they can inspire" to "the objects of valuable contemplation and communion." Much agreement with Moore remained, however. As Keynes put it in "My Early Beliefs," he continued to believe that Moore's "religion" remained "nearer the truth than any other that I know of." It was, he claimed, still his "religion under the surface."

The belief in the importance and danger of irrationality opened both Woolf and Keynes to the insights available from Freud. Though they appropriated these insights in very different ways, they both made important use of them. Woolf drew from psychoanalysis his understanding of the nature of the "sense of sin" and of the role this played in barbarism. It also informed his understanding of how to eliminate barbarism. Keynes drew from it his understanding of the nature of the "vulgar passions" and of the threat these posed to civilization. Many of his proposals for dealing with this threat also appear to make use of psychoanalysis.

These Bloomsbury appropriations of Freud do not appear to have significantly influenced the development of psychoanalysis in Britain. Contemporary interest (in Britain and elsewhere) in the integration of psychoanalysis and the critique of political economy may perhaps have something to learn from these appropriations, however, particularly when ac-

102 Keynes, Essays in Biography, p. 442.
count is taken of the fact that, in the writings of Woolf and Keynes, the interest of Bloomsbury in psychoanalysis has been combined with the interest in the psychological aspects of politics and economics.

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